True Diplomacy at Yalta
February, 1945: the end of World War II was fast approaching. Questions about post-war plans for Europe loomed over the consciences of Roosevelt, Stalin, and Churchill. It was clear that the alliance of the superpowers (also known as ‘The Big Three’) was vital to the success of international peace.

For seven days, beginning on February 4th, leaders from the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union convened on Russian soil at Livadia Palace in Yalta. Sometimes called the ‘Crimea Conference’ and code-named ‘Argonaut,’ the meeting took place sub rosa. There, The Big Three established a strategy for the surrender, demilitarization, and division of Germany, discussed the formation of the United Nations, and promised a bright future for the oppressed Eastern European countries by signing the Declaration of Liberated Europe.

Many other agreements were sealed behind closed doors, most concerning of which was the concession of Eastern Europe to the Soviet Union’s oppressive, communistic government. However, the alleged ‘failure’ of Yalta that haunts the memories of many was not a result of the conference, nor was the breakdown of relations between Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin. Diplomacy was impossible after the Soviets violated the agreements made at Yalta concerning Poland and other Eastern European countries (see Appendix). Roosevelt and Churchill could not have anticipated such an enormous breach in trust on the part of their Soviet ally. Perhaps they were misguided in believing that
Stalin would uphold the tenets of democracy in the Soviet Union’s sphere of influence.

Still, we must not cogitate over what could have happened had Yalta produced different results. Instead, we should reexamine the conference without discrimination. It is unreasonable to form a valid conclusion about the Crimea Conference when assessing only the concessions made by each individual. Conversely, it is essential to study the positions of each country at the time, the political motivations of each of the Big Three, and the historically complex relationship between democratic and communistic ideology.

Roosevelt did not ‘betray’ the United States or Europe in his negotiations with Stalin. One must consider the individual positions of the nations. “What people don’t understand is that you can rarely win at the conference table what you have not won on the battlefield.” (Bissel 22). The Red Army had already penetrated Poland and pervaded Eastern Europe. Because of this, Stalin had obvious leverage in negotiations. This he recognized and used to his greatest advantage.

Stalin’s main interest was Soviet control of Poland. He was blunt and firm in his belief that the USSR needed a buffer against future attacks, primarily from Germany. A Communist administration (and Stalin’s ‘puppet’), had already been established at Lublin, but its existence was at odds with the pro-Western government-in-exile. Roosevelt proposed free elections to balance the two powers, for he knew that Stalin had an iron grip on Poland and would not let democratic leaders control him. The Soviet leader, in turn, agreed to support free elections because he knew that the United States would not be in Europe long after the war concluded (Fleming 486). Without the watchful eye of Roosevelt, the Russians would be allowed to determine exactly which “democratic and anti-Nazi parties” would have the right to participate at the polls (see
Engbith – True Diplomacy at Yalta

Appendix). On this issue it is believed that Roosevelt invested too much trust in Stalin. However, it was not until after the conference that Stalin’s true intentions became clear.

It is also thought by some that Roosevelt did not care about the Poles and that he only took the time to negotiate with Stalin because of the impending American election (Fleming 488). Six or seven million Polish votes were to be won upon his return. It is true that Roosevelt made attempts to clear the wording of the final text. Still, because of the military situation (especially after the Allies’ defeat at the Battle of the Bulge), it was impossible for him to persuade Stalin to moderate his demands (Setttinus 301). More pressing issues were at stake, such as the war with Japan (Brands 803). Roosevelt felt it was more important to gain the Soviets’ confidence for the sole purpose of an expedient end to the war and lasting international peace.

What of the United States’ position at Yalta? Let us review the major points of contention that arose. Roosevelt conceded extensive expansion rights to Stalin in exchange for assistance in Japan. He ‘sold out’ Poland and abandoned the Eastern European countries. To secure the Soviet Union’s participation in the United Nations, Roosevelt tailored the voting procedure to Stalin’s wishes.

Most people adduce the aforementioned decisions as rationale to condemn Roosevelt’s actions at Yalta, but we must consider the conference in context. The former president believed that a million American lives would be saved if Russia entered the Pacific War. The United States was in no position to demand much of Stalin in Eastern Europe (Gunther 358). Thousands of Red Army soldiers had already been stationed there by the time of the conference. Roosevelt did succeed in denying Stalin’s request for fourteen extra votes in the UN General Assembly. Instead, he received three - one for the
USSR, another for Ukraine, and the third for White Russia (see Appendix).

Not only did Roosevelt have to discuss these issues with extreme caution, he faced opposition from without. Anti-Soviet isolationists kept a watchful eye on his concessions. The Britons and French were unwilling to accept the USSR as an honest ally and could not understand why Stalin’s friendship was so important. Roosevelt knew that the Soviets were in a position to befriend the Axis powers if the Allies did not fulfill their requests (Powaski 63). Noting his country’s precarious position, Roosevelt was successful in pursuing achievable goals: “At the end of the first day it was apparent that we faced a reasonable situation at the Crimea Conference.” (Stettinus 306)

The disintegration of international relations following Yalta simply confirmed the observable trends that presented themselves from the beginning of World War II through the end of the Cold War. It is believed by some that the ideals of each nation were similar enough to promote peace (Brands 798). This, however, is wholly erroneous. The United States government was abandoning its Wilsonian policy of isolationism and taking an active stance in the crusade for international peace (Fleming 485). The Soviets, ever cautious of the capitalistic nations, were eager to extend their communistic influence throughout the world. Great Britain sat between the two powers, concerned with the inclusion of France in post-war plans, a united Germany, and influence in the Far East. No leader shared a common objective (Laloy 67). Above all, the deception of Stalin can be identified as the main reason for the foundering of the Grand Alliance.

Only in retrospect did Stalin’s motivations become clear. Alger Hiss, a lawyer who accompanied Roosevelt to Yalta, described in his memoir the Soviet’s demeanor as somewhat of a paradox: the premier was a ruthless tyrant, a skilled negotiator, and
powerful leader (118). He and James F. Byrne, director of the Office of War Mobilization, were fooled into believing that Stalin’s intentions aligned with those of Roosevelt. They left Yalta with the firm hope that Soviets and Americans would continue to cooperate for the common goal of world peace (Hiss 126).

Just two weeks after the conference, Stalin violated the Declaration of Liberated Europe by installing Communist governments in Bulgaria, Romania, Albania, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland. This change in policy was the turning point that initiated the collapse of Yalta (Gunther 360). The aftermath of the war did not matter to the Soviets - they were only out for themselves. Stalin had no need to enter diplomatic relations with the United States or Britain; he did it only to further his own cause of Communist expansionism. The platform upon which the Grand Alliance was based collapsed because of Stalin’s complete disregard for any nation other than his own.

One can easily divide the so-called Grand Alliance into two distinct alliances: one between the Soviet Union and America, and the other, America and Great Britain. While it is true that the latter relationship was bound mainly by the common interest in democratic policies, the former was much more a marriage of convenience. However, it seemed that Roosevelt and Stalin had differing opinions on the meaning of the relationship. Even more consequential was the clash of democratic principles and communist philosophy. These factors precipitated the fallout between the once-allied nations.

“The prospect of defeat is the only sure way of deterring the Soviet Union.” (Clifford 44) The United States was considered to be the most dangerous threat to communism. Unlike Churchill and other leaders of Western, pro-democracy nations,
Roosevelt sought to befriend Stalin. He was practical in his dealings and recognized the limits of his power. He carefully examined his own interests and presented them in a way that he believed Stalin would find acceptable. Roosevelt’s critics often argue that the president did not understand with whom he was dealing. Stalin, in true Soviet tradition, believed that ‘compromise’ was synonymous with ‘weakness.’ (Clifford 43). Had Roosevelt been more rigid at Yalta, however, nothing would have been accomplished. The differences between the ideals of democratic capitalists and totalitarian communists were insurmountable.

What were the ultimate consequences of Yalta? Historians often cite the division of Europe, the formation of the United Nations, the end of Soviet-American relations, the beginning of the Cold War, or other outcomes subject to opinion. In terms of lasting impact, the conference has served, above all, as an educational symbol.

Roosevelt believed that cooperation with the Soviets was the only way to protect both democratic and capitalistic principles (Rose 32). He preserved the Grand Alliance in a time when the world could not afford to lose such an important coalition. This was achieved through diplomacy in which the intricate balance of powers was fully recognized. It is possible that today, without the lessons of diplomacy that came about as a result of Yalta, the United States would not be able to maintain a productive relationship with Russia (Stettinus 324).

An effective ambassadorial meeting occurs when leaders make agreements based on careful inspection of the conditions under which they must negotiate. According to this definition, Roosevelt triumphed at the Yalta Conference.
Appendix

Text of the Yalta Conference

February, 1945

Washington, March 24 - The text of the agreements reached at the Crimea (Yalta) Conference between President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill and Generalissimo Stalin, as released by the State Department today, follows:

Protocol of Proceedings of Crimea Conference

The Crimea Conference of the heads of the Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which took place from Feb. 4 to 11, came to the following conclusions:

I. WORLD ORGANIZATION

It was decided:

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1 See “The Yalta Conference” under annotate bibliography.
1. That a United Nations conference on the proposed world organization should be
summoned for Wednesday, 25 April, 1945, and should be held in the United States of
America.

2. The nations to be invited to this conference should be:

(a) the United Nations as they existed on 8 Feb., 1945; and

(b) Such of the Associated Nations as have declared war on the common enemy by 1
March, 1945. (For this purpose, by the term "Associated Nations" was meant the eight
Associated Nations and Turkey.) When the conference on world organization is held, the
delegates of the United Kingdom and United State of America will support a proposal to
admit to original membership two Soviet Socialist Republics, i.e., the Ukraine and White
Russia.

3. That the United States Government, on behalf of the three powers, should consult the
Government of China and the French Provisional Government in regard to decisions
taken at the present conference concerning the proposed world organization.

4. That the text of the invitation to be issued to all the nations which would take part in
the United Nations conference should be as follows:

"The Government of the United States of America, on behalf of itself and of the
Governments of the United Kingdom, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the
Republic of China and of the Provisional Government of the French Republic invite the
Government of -------- to send representatives to a conference to be held on 25 April,
1945, or soon thereafter, at San Francisco, in the United States of America, to prepare a
charter for a general international organization for the maintenance of international peace and security.

"The above-named Governments suggest that the conference consider as affording a basis for such a Charter the proposals for the establishment of a general international organization which were made public last October as a result of the Dumbarton Oaks conference and which have now been supplemented by the following provisions for Section C of Chapter VI:

C. Voting

"1. Each member of the Security Council should have one vote.

"2. Decisions of the Security Council on procedural matters should be made by an affirmative vote of seven members.

"3. Decisions of the Security Council on all matters should be made by an affirmative vote of seven members, including the concurring votes of the permanent members; provided that, in decisions under Chapter VIII, Section A and under the second sentence of Paragraph 1 of Chapter VIII, Section C, a party to a dispute should abstain from voting.'

"Further information as to arrangements will be transmitted subsequently.

"In the event that the Government of ------- desires in advance of the conference to present views or comments concerning the proposals, the Government of the United States of America will be pleased to transmit such views and comments to the other participating Governments."
Territorial trusteeship:

It was agreed that the five nations which will have permanent seats on the Security Council should consult each other prior to the United Nations conference on the question of territorial trusteeship.

The acceptance of this recommendation is subject to its being made clear that territorial trusteeship will only apply to

(a) existing mandates of the League of Nations;
(b) territories detached from the enemy as a result of the present war;
(c) any other territory which might voluntarily be placed under trusteeship; and
(d) no discussion of actual territories is contemplated at the forthcoming United Nations conference or in the preliminary consultations, and it will be a matter for subsequent agreement which territories within the above categories will be placed under trusteeship.

[Begin first section published Feb., 13, 1945.]

II. DECLARATION OF LIBERATED EUROPE

The following declaration has been approved:

The Premier of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom and the President of the United States of America have consulted with each other in the common interests of the people of their countries and those of liberated Europe. They jointly declare their mutual agreement to concert during the temporary period of instability in liberated Europe the policies of their three Governments in
assisting the peoples liberated from the domination of Nazi Germany and the peoples of the former Axis satellite states of Europe to solve by democratic means their pressing political and economic problems.

The establishment of order in Europe and the rebuilding of national economic life must be achieved by processes which will enable the liberated peoples to destroy the last vestiges of nazism and fascism and to create democratic institutions of their own choice. This is a principle of the Atlantic Charter - the right of all people to choose the form of government under which they will live - the restoration of sovereign rights and self-government to those peoples who have been forcibly deprived to them by the aggressor nations.

To foster the conditions in which the liberated people may exercise these rights, the three governments will jointly assist the people in any European liberated state or former Axis state in Europe where, in their judgment conditions require,

(a) to establish conditions of internal peace;
(b) to carry out emergency relief measures for the relief of distressed peoples;
(c) to form interim governmental authorities broadly representative of all democratic elements in the population and pledged to the earliest possible establishment through free elections of Governments responsive to the will of the people; and
(d) to facilitate where necessary the holding of such elections.
The three Governments will consult the other United Nations and provisional authorities
or other Governments in Europe when matters of direct interest to them are under
consideration.

When, in the opinion of the three Governments, conditions in any European liberated
state or former Axis satellite in Europe make such action necessary, they will
immediately consult together on the measure necessary to discharge the joint
responsibilities set forth in this declaration.

By this declaration we reaffirm our faith in the principles of the Atlantic Charter, our
pledge in the Declaration by the United Nations and our determination to build in
cooperation with other peace-loving nations world order, under law, dedicated to peace,
security, freedom and general well-being of all mankind.

In issuing this declaration, the three powers express the hope that the Provisional
Government of the French Republic may be associated with them in the procedure
suggested.

[End first section published Feb., 13, 1945.]

III. DISMEMBERMENT OF GERMANY

It was agreed that Article 12 (a) of the Surrender terms for Germany should be amended
to read as follows:

"The United Kingdom, the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist
RepUBLICS shall possess supreme authority with respect to Germany. In the exercise of
such authority they will take such steps, including the complete dismemberment of Germany as they deem requisite for future peace and security."

The study of the procedure of the dismemberment of Germany was referred to a committee consisting of Mr. Anthony Eden, Mr. John Winant, and Mr. Fedor T. Gusev. This body would consider the desirability of associating with it a French representative.

IV. ZONE OF OCCUPATION FOR THE FRENCH AND CONTROL COUNCIL FOR GERMANY.

It was agreed that a zone in Germany, to be occupied by the French forces, should be allocated France. This zone would be formed out of the British and American zones and its extent would be settled by the British and Americans in consultation with the French Provisional Government.

It was also agreed that the French Provisional Government should be invited to become a member of the Allied Control Council for Germany.

V. REPARATION

The following protocol has been approved:

Protocol

On the Talks Between the Heads of Three Governments at the Crimean Conference on the Question of the German Reparations in Kind

1. Germany must pay in kind for the losses caused by her to the Allied nations in the course of the war. Reparations are to be received in the first instance by those countries
which have borne the main burden of the war, have suffered the heaviest losses and have organized victory over the enemy.

2. Reparation in kind is to be exacted from Germany in three following forms:

   (a) Removals within two years from the surrender of Germany or the cessation of organized resistance from the national wealth of Germany located on the territory of Germany herself as well as outside her territory (equipment, machine tools, ships, rolling stock, German investments abroad, shares of industrial, transport and other enterprises in Germany, etc.), these removals to be carried out chiefly for the purpose of destroying the war potential of Germany.

   (b) Annual deliveries of goods from current production for a period to be fixed.

   (c) Use of German labor.

3. For the working out on the above principles of a detailed plan for exaction of reparation from Germany an Allied reparation commission will be set up in Moscow. It will consist of three representatives - one from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, one from the United Kingdom and one from the United States of America.

4. With regard to the fixing of the total sum of the reparation as well as the distribution of it among the countries which suffered from the German aggression, the Soviet and American delegations agreed as follows:

"The Moscow reparation commission should take in its initial studies as a basis for discussion the suggestion of the Soviet Government that the total sum of the reparation in accordance with the points (a) and (b) of the Paragraph 2 should be 22 billion dollars and that 50 per cent should go to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics."
The British delegation was of the opinion that, pending consideration of the reparation question by the Moscow reparation commission, no figures of reparation should be mentioned.

The above Soviet-American proposal has been passed to the Moscow reparation commission as one of the proposals to be considered by the commission.

VI. MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS

The conference agreed that the question of the major war criminals should be the subject of inquiry by the three Foreign Secretaries for report in due course after the close of the conference.

[Begin second section published Feb. 13, 1945.]

VII. POLAND

The following declaration on Poland was agreed by the conference:

"A new situation has been created in Poland as a result of her complete liberation by the Red Army. This calls for the establishment of a Polish Provisional Government which can be more broadly based than was possible before the recent liberation of the western part of Poland. The Provisional Government which is now functioning in Poland should therefore be reorganized on a broader democratic basis with the inclusion of democratic leaders from Poland itself and from Poles abroad. This new Government should then be called the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity.

"M. Molotov, Mr. Harriman and Sir A. Clark Kerr are authorized as a commission to consult in the first instance in Moscow with members of the present Provisional
Government and with other Polish democratic leaders from within Poland and from abroad, with a view to the reorganization of the present Government along the above lines. This Polish Provisional Government of National Unity shall be pledged to the holding of free and unfettered elections as soon as possible on the basis of universal suffrage and secret ballot. In these elections all democratic and anti-Nazi parties shall have the right to take part and to put forward candidates.

"When a Polish Provisional Government of National Unity has been properly formed in conformity with the above, the Government of the U.S.S.R., which now maintains diplomatic relations with the present Provisional Government of Poland, and the Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of the United States of America will establish diplomatic relations with the new Polish Provisional Government National Unity, and will exchange Ambassadors by whose reports the respective Governments will be kept informed about the situation in Poland.

"The three heads of Government consider that the eastern frontier of Poland should follow the Curzon Line with digressions from it in some regions of five to eight kilometers in favor of Poland. They recognize that Poland must receive substantial accessions in territory in the north and west. They feel that the opinion of the new Polish Provisional Government of National Unity should be sought in due course of the extent of these accessions and that the final delimitation of the western frontier of Poland should thereafter await the peace conference."

**VIII. YUGOSLAVIA**

It was agreed to recommend to Marshal Tito and to Dr. Ivan Subasitch:
(a) That the Tito-Subasitch agreement should immediately be put into effect and a new
government formed on the basis of the agreement.

(b) That as soon as the new Government has been formed it should declare:

(I) That the Anti-Fascist Assembly of the National Liberation (AVNOJ) will be extended
to include members of the last Yugoslav Skupstina who have not compromised
themselves by collaboration with the enemy, thus forming a body to be known as a
temporary Parliament and

(II) That legislative acts passed by the Anti-Fascist Assembly of the National Liberation
(AVNOJ) will be subject to subsequent ratification by a Constituent Assembly; and that
this statement should be published in the communiqué of the conference.

IX. ITALO-YOGOSLAV FRONTIER - ITALO-AUSTRIAN FRONTIER

Notes on these subjects were put in by the British delegation and the American and
Soviet delegations agreed to consider them and give their views later.

X. YUGOSLAV-BULGARIAN RELATIONS

There was an exchange of views between the Foreign Secretaries on the question of the
desirability of a Yugoslav-Bulgarian pact of alliance. The question at issue was whether a
state still under an armistice regime could be allowed to enter into a treaty with another
state. Mr. Eden suggested that the Bulgarian and Yugoslav Governments should be
informed that this could not be approved. Mr. Stettinius suggested that the British and
American Ambassadors should discuss the matter further with Mr. Molotov in Moscow.
Mr. Molotov agreed with the proposal of Mr. Stettinius.

XI. SOUTHEASTERN EUROPE
The British delegation put in notes for the consideration of their colleagues on the following subjects:

(a) The Control Commission in Bulgaria.

(b) Greek claims upon Bulgaria, more particularly with reference to reparations.

(c) Oil equipment in Rumania.

XII. IRAN

Mr. Eden, Mr. Stettinius and Mr. Molotov exchanged views on the situation in Iran. It was agreed that this matter should be pursued through the diplomatic channel.

XIII. MEETINGS OF THE THREE FOREIGN SECRETARIES

The conference agreed that permanent machinery should be set up for consultation between the three Foreign Secretaries; they should meet as often as necessary, probably about every three or four months.

These meetings will be held in rotation in the three capitals, the first meeting being held in London.

XIV. THE MONTREAUX CONVENTION AND THE STRAITS

It was agreed that at the next meeting of the three Foreign Secretaries to be held in London, they should consider proposals which it was understood the Soviet Government
would put forward in relation to the Montreaux Convention, and report to their
Governments. The Turkish Government should be informed at the appropriate moment.

The foregoing protocol was approved and signed by the three Foreign Secretaries at the
Crimean Conference Feb. 11, 1945.

E. R. Stettinius Jr.
M. Molotov
Anthony Eden

AGREEMENT REGARDING JAPAN

The leaders of the three great powers - the Soviet Union, the United States of America
and Great Britain - have agreed that in two or three months after Germany has
surrendered and the war in Europe is terminated, the Soviet Union shall enter into war
against Japan on the side of the Allies on condition that:

1. The status quo in Outer Mongolia (the Mongolian People's Republic) shall be
   preserved.

2. The former rights of Russia violated by the treacherous attack of Japan in 1904
   shall be restored, viz.:
   (a) The southern part of Sakhalin as well as the islands adjacent to it shall be
   returned to the Soviet Union;
   (b) The commercial port of Dairen shall be internationalized, the pre-eminent
   interests of the Soviet Union in this port being safeguarded, and the lease of Port
   Arthur as a naval base of the U.S.S.R. restored;
(c) The Chinese-Eastern Railroad and the South Manchurian Railroad, which provide an outlet to Dairen, shall be jointly operated by the establishment of a joint Soviet-Chinese company, it being understood that the pre-eminent interests of the Soviet Union shall be safeguarded and that China shall retain sovereignty in Manchuria;

3. The Kurile Islands shall be handed over to the Soviet Union.

It is understood that the agreement concerning Outer Mongolia and the ports and railroads referred to above will require concurrence of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. The President will take measures in order to maintain this concurrence on advice from Marshal Stalin.

The heads of the three great powers have agreed that these claims of the Soviet Union shall be unquestionably fulfilled after Japan has been defeated.

For its part, the Soviet Union expresses its readiness to conclude with the National Government of China a pact of friendship and alliance between the U.S.S.R. and China in order to render assistance to China with its armed forces for the purpose of liberating China from the Japanese yoke.

Joseph Stalin

Franklin D. Roosevelt

Winston S. Churchill

February 11, 1945.
Annotated Bibliography

*Primary Sources*


This first-hand account of the events aided me in recognizing the sensitive nature of diplomacy immediately prior to the Cold War.


Examining the results of the conference from the perspective of President Roosevelt’s close ally allowed me to form a broader understanding of Yalta’s global implications.

Mr. Clark’s notable memorandum to President Truman was intriguing in that it included a unique call to militarize and prepare for a Soviet attack. It highlighted the drastic change in American attitudes towards the USSR following the breakdown of the Grand Alliance.


Mr. De Gaulle had not been not included at Yalta. I felt it was important to review a nonmember’s opinion regarding the outcome of the conference, especially considering France’s consequential role in the war effort.


This article reflected the Americans’ clear approval of Yalta immediately following President Roosevelt’s return from the Crimea. I read it before researching the topic, and, like many citizens at the time, concluded that the conference was a complete success. By reading this article, I was able to understand the glossing over of much weightier issues boiling beneath the surface.


Mr. Hiss was among several government officials who accompanied President Roosevelt to Yalta. He was later convicted of betraying State Department documents to the Russians. His personal account of the conference was significant in that, unlike most, he had no stake in the politics. His honest,
objective observations were helpful in forming a broader overview of the exchanges between the Big Three.


This article made clear the sweeping generalizations of the agreements at Yalta that would later lead to ‘misinterpretations’ and, ultimately, the breakdown of the Grand Alliance.


The secret deal concerning the voting procedure in the United Nations Organization had just been leaked by the *New York Herald Tribune*. This article was a call for the American public to question what other ‘sell-outs’ had been made at Yalta. So began the era of anti-Soviet sentiments and distrust in the American government’s ability to handle foreign policy.


This essay was crucial to my comprehension of politics during the Cold War. Mr. Leffler offers a revisionist’s study of the United States’ approach in dealing with the Soviet Union. His arguments were important to my research in that they were not infused with the “Red Fever” that plagued most authors of the
It also postulated on the true nature of diplomacy, which I found to be an important argument in defense of President Roosevelt’s actions at Yalta.


Roosevelt’s and Churchill’s messages painted a vivid portrait of the sometimes contentious relationship between the two powerful leaders. It was essential to understand this alliance without the bias of biographers who might have been partial to one or the other.


<http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,779217,00.html>.

This article shows the drastic change in attitudes towards the Soviets just two years following Yalta. It had become clear that the government would have to rethink its policies in light of Stalin’s dishonorable actions.


As an informed reader, it was clear to me that this address was a simple mask for the turbulent nature of Yalta. It was not hard to understand the American people’s anger upon hearing of the censored concessions regarding the Far East and the United Nations.

The language of this document was even more vague than that of the actual Yalta communiqué. It made evident the sensitive atmosphere of the time, in which no one wished to create unnecessary trouble.


In order to fully understand President Roosevelt’s motives and goals for the US at Yalta, it was imperative to understand the state of America prior to the conference.


Mr. Stettinus provided an insightful account of the dealings at Yalta. He shared the same philosophy about the Russians as Roosevelt had, and provided cogent rationale for the leader’s decisions.


It would not have been possible to understand any explanations of the Yalta agreements without the original text from the meeting.

[http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,791985,00.html].

Written only two weeks following Yalta, this article indicated the inevitable breakdown of the Grand Alliance and gave a voice to disgruntled France. It was essential to my research in that I had not considered the latter and decided to research de Gaulle’s position further.


[http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,937132,00.html].

This interesting article provided a harsh view on President Roosevelt’s policies regarding the Soviet Union and establishes his ‘shortcoming’ at Yalta as a moral issue. It was crucial for me to understand the attacks on the President in order to write a balanced report.


During this interview, President Roosevelt spoke both bluntly and cagily on the issues discussed at Yalta. I was able to gain an idea of his desire to please the public and appease Congress.
Secondary Sources


Mr. Brands’ book offered a fresh view of President Roosevelt as a clever negotiator and informed statesman whose successes at Yalta, in the long run, achieved his ultimate goal of international peace.


This article was published just a few days before completing my research paper. It allowed me to examine the current state of Soviet-American relations.


The world of 1989 was much different from that of 1945. Still, relations with the Soviet Union remained tantamount as the Cold War steadily drew to a close. This article was important in that it examined what might have occurred had the agreements at Yalta been different. I learned that this is not the way to
present my research. Rather, I resolved to focus on what could be learned from
the actual occurrences instead of ruminating on what might have been.

Fleming, Thomas. *The New Dealers’ War: Franklin D. Roosevelt and the War Within

Mr. Fleming’s book was an important source because it challenged other
biographers’ beliefs that President Roosevelt did all he could at Yalta, considering
the complex situation at hand.

Print.

This book discussed Roosevelt’s political motives for his concessions at
Yalta, including the impending presidential election back in America.

Hamby, Alonzo L. "Endgame; How the Big Three concluded the Good War." *The Weekly

Mr. Hamby made strong arguments in defense of President Roosevelt’s
concessions at Yalta, which contrasted sharply with many of the Cold War ‘FDR-
haters’ inflicted with “Red Fever” from the mid-40’s through the 80’s.

This book was important to my research because it was written at a time when the Cold War was cooling off. It was also written by a Frenchman, who provides an interesting perspective on Yalta’s global implications.


Mr. Meacham wrote an excellent chronicle of the relationship between Churchill and President Roosevelt. He also did well in describing the atmosphere surrounding the negotiations at Yalta, something that is usually ignored by other historians.


This book gave an accurate portrait of Josef Stalin’s ideology and his motivations at the Yalta conference. It helped me better understand the Soviet’s position before, during, and after engaging in talks with Churchill and President Roosevelt.


Mr. Powaski detailed the complex working relationship between President Roosevelt and Stalin. It underscored the truly cautious but conciliatory manner with which each leader negotiated his way through Yalta.
Ms. Rose’s book offered much information about the background and repercussions of the Yalta conference. Her objective presentation allowed me to form my own opinions before researching primary sources.


This essay argued that President Roosevelt was a naive, ideological leader who was concerned only with the game of power politics and self-interest. It became obvious to me that it was very simple to criminalize the President’s actions when considered out of context. I was then inspired to research the conference from all points of view. I wished to create an accurate account of the era so that I could correctly weigh the successes against the failures.